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is found in our books, is certainly moulded in these forms of action, is much and justly lauded as a science of the most logical
cast, calculated to eliminate with the utmost precision one certain
definite issue of fact or law. That system was much broken in by
a statute more than a hundred years old in England, which
allowed double pleas, and of course several issues; and practically
it is out of use by the latitude given to what is termed the general
issue, by which the defendant is permitted, by a general denial,
to controvert in mass all the allegations of the plaintiff. Thus a
door has been opened to all the uncertainty feared to result from
the -abolition of forms, but which may really be more effectually
guarded against by suitable provisions requiring distinct allegations of all matters of fact insisted on, and distinct denials of such
as are controverted. If indeed these allegations, on both sides,
should be required to be verified by the oath or affirmation of the
parties, the result would, in all probability, be to reduce the number and complexities of the issues in every case.
G.S.
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Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
SAMUEL VEAZIE VS. RUFUS DWINEL.
RUFUS DWINEL V8. SAMUEL VEAZIE.
The internal streams of this state, above where the tide ebbs and flows, ana
-above where boat navigation is practicable, are to be regarded as in some sense
public highways, for the transportation of rafts of lumber and the floating of
logs, in those parts of the state where this species of transportation is of indis.
pensable necessity to, and has been long acquiesced in by, the inhabitants.
In regard to such streams the proprietors of mill sites, and those who erewt and
use mills thereon, are bound to make and use such mills, with reference to the
correlative right in the owners of timber land adjoining such streams, to float the
same, at proper stages of water, to places convenient for its manufacture, and for
market; and any unreasonable and unnecessary obstruction of this latter use of
the stream, either by the mode of erecting mills or dams, on such stream, or by
throwing waste rubbish into the stream, or in any other mode, will be regarded
as a common nuisance, liable to abatement, and affording just cause of action in
favor of such as suffer special damage thereby.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
RIc, J.-The above cases come before the court on full reports
of evidenceb. They all refer to the same subject-matter, and the
evidence submitted and the facts admitted or proved, apply with
slight exceptions to all. Though the evidence reported is very
voluminous, the facts, on which the rights of the parties depend,
are neither numerous nor complicated. As a foundation for the
application of legal principles pertinent to the issues presented, we
state the controlling facts established by the evidence reported.
They are as follows:
The Penobscot River, at the point where the mills of the parties
are located, is a fresh water stream, not affected by the ebb and
flow of the tide, but of sufficient capacity in its natural state to
float logs, rafts, and lumber;
That the mill site of Veazie was first occupied as such in 1801,
and has been thus occupied from that time to the present; and
*themill site of Dwinel has been occupied as such, from 1803 to
the present time;
That Dwinel's dams by which the head of water was raised and
has been maintained, consist of a structure across the western
branch of the main river and a side dam between Goat Island and
Webster Islaud, through which latter structure tlhere has been a
sluice for the passage of rafts, logs, &c.;
That Dwinel and his predecessors hl.ve ever maintained a convenient and suitable passage way for rafts, logs, and lumber, from
Veazie's Mills to and through the sluice in the side dam, except
when the same has been obstructed by slabs and other waste
material thrown into the same by the occupants of Veazie's Mills,
and except also a portion of the year .1854, when the "gap" or
"breach" in the side dam was permitted to remain unrepaired;
That the piers placed in the "basin" were constructed with ths
knowledge and assent of Veazie, and had a tendency, with the
boom, attached thereto, to render more safe and convenient the
passage for rafti to the sluice, as well as the passage for logs to
the mill pond of Dwinel;
That in 1846 Dwinel reconstructed or rebuilt his dam across the
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main stream, and increased the eficient heigh~t thereof, but not to
such an extent as to obstruct the operation of any mills then in
existence on the mill site occupied by Veazie;
That the practice of throwing slabs, edgings, and other waste
materials into the stream, from mills on the Penobscot river, has
prevailed from an early period, and, with few exceptions, prevails
at the present day;
These propositions, which we think are well established by the
evidence in the case, cover the main facts in controversy, u'pon
which the rights of the parties depend, and the application of
established legal principles thereto will dispose of all the cases
before us without detailed examination of each particular case.
.First,then, do the dams and mills of either party, exist in violation of law? Or in other words do they, or either of them, constitute public or private nuisances?
A nuisance has been defined as any thing that worketh hurt,
inconvenience, or damage: 8 Black. Com. 116.
A public or common nuisance is such an inconvenience, or
troublesome offene, as annoys the whole community in general,
and not merely some particular person: 1 How. 197 ; 4 Black.

Com. 166, 167.
A private nuisance is anything done to the hurt, or annoyance
of the lands, tenements, or hereditaments of another: 8 Black.
215.
All erections and impediments made by the owners of adjacent
lands to the free use of rivers which are navigable for boats and
rifts, are deemed nuisances,: 8 Kent Com. -411.
These are general principles, and do not of course apply to obstructions or other inconveniences which are authorized by law.
Such are not nuisances: Tru8tees vs. Utica, 6 Barb. 818. The
subject will be further examined in another part of the case.
To encourage the erection and maintenance of water mills, has
long been the established policy of this state, and of Massachusetts before our separation. Our Mill-Act, as it is termed, had
its origin in the latter state, in the early part of the last century,
and has been continued, with slight modifications, both in Massa-
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chusetts and this state, to the present time. The object of the
statute was thus stated in the preamble to this law, at its origin:
"Whereas it has been found by experience, that when some
persons in this province have been at great cost and expenses for
building of mills serviceable for the public good and benefit of the
town, or considerable neighborhood in or near to which they have
been erected, that in raising a suitable head of water for that service, it hath sometimes so happened that some small quantity of
lands or meadows have been thereby flowed and damnified, not
belonging to the owner or owners of such mill or mfllsf, whereby
several controversies and law-suits have arisen, for the prevention
whereof for the future. Be it therefore enacted, &c." Ancient
Charters, p. 404.
In 1796, February 27, the legislature of Massachusetts passed
an additional or amendatory act, the preamble and first section of
.which are as follows:
"Whereas the erection and support.of mills to accommodate the
inhabitants of the several parts of the state ought- not to be discouraged by many doubts and disputes; and some special provisions are found necessary relative to the flowing of adjacent
lands, and mills held by several proprietors. Therefore, Be it
enacted, &c."
"That when any person hath already erected, or shall erect any
water mill on his own land or on the land of any other person, by
nis consent legally obtained, and to the working of such mills it
shall be found necessary to raise a suitable head of water; and in
so doing any lands shall be flowed not belonging to the owner of
such mill, it shall be lawful for the owner or occupant of such mill
to continue the same head of water on the terms hereinafter mentioned."
This 'provision was incorporated into our Statutes in 1821,
Smith's Laws, Vol. 1, chi 45, and was in force when the dams
on both mill sites now occupied by the parties were originally
erected.
It will be perceived that the act isi in its terms, very broad, and
applies to all cases whether the streams were navigable or otherwise.
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By the Act of 1840, ch. 126, § 1, Rev. St., it is provided that
any man may erect and maintain a water mill and dam to raise
water for working it, upon and across any stream that is not navigable upon the terms and conditions and subject to the regulations hereinafter expressed.
The facts show that Dwinel's dam has been raised since 1840,
and it is contended that this has been done without authority,
because the river at that point is a navigable stream.
This raises the distinct question, what is a navigable stream,
within the meaning of the Statute of 1840 ?
There is a distinction at common law between navigable rivers,
technically so called, and rivers which have sufficient capacity to
float boats, rafts, and logs, and are subjected to the servitude o"
the public, and which are, therefore, denominated public highways.
All rivers where the tide ebbs and flows are, by the Common
Law, denominated navigable rivers: Com. Dig. .Navigation B,
and Prerogative D. 50; 8 Kent's Com. 412: Ward vs. Oreawell,
3 Wills 265 Scott vs. Wilson, 3 N. H. 321.
A river is deemed navigable in the technical sense of the t~rm
as high from the mouth as the tide ebbs and flows : Ang. on
Watercourses 205; Berry vs. Carl, 3 Me. 869; Com. vs. Chapini
5 Pick. 199; Spring vs. Russell, 7 Me. 278; Brown vs. Chadbourn, 31 Me. 9; Knox vs. Claloner, 42 Me. 150; 'Strout -vs.
Mill-bridge Co., 45 Me. 76; Palmer vs. Mulligan, 3 Caine's R.
807.
Lord HALE in his De Jure Maris ch. 3, says "there be some
streams or rivers that are private not-only in propriety or ownership, but in use, as little streams and rivers that are not of common passage for the King's people. Again, there be other rivers
as well fresh as salt, that are of common or public use for the carriage of boats and lighters, and these, whether fresh or salt,
whether they flow and reflow or not, are primafacie,publicijunis,
common highways for man or goods, or b6th from one inland towr
to another." And he instances the Wey, the Severn, and the
Thames, as rivers of that description.
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All streams in this state of sufficient capacity, in their natural
condition, to float boats, rafts, or logs, are deemed public highways, and as such, subject to thejuse of the public: Wadsworth vs.
Smith, 2 Fair. 278; Berry vs. Carl,8 Me. 269; Spring vs. Russell,
7 Me. 273; Brown vs. O-adbourn, 81 Me. 9; Knox vs. Ohaloner,
42 Me. 150.
In Brown vs. Chadbourn, WELLS, J., remarks, in giving the
opinion of the court: "In this state the rights of public use have
never been carried so far as to place fresh water streams on the
same ground as those in which the tide ebbs and flows, and which
alone are considered strictly navigable at common law."
In Spring.vs. Russell, MELLEN, C. J., remarked, "Saco river,
in the town of Fryeburg, is one of the character above described;
not a navigable river, however deep and large, in common law language, being above tide waters, but is under servitude to, the public interests, and over the waters of which the public have a right
to pass. In this respect such a river resembles a highway on
land."
Though in many of the states of the Union, which are intersected or bounded by the great rivers of the continent, the common law distinction between navigable rivers, and those which are
simply recognised as highways, does not exist; in this state, as
has been seen, the common law definition: has been fully recognised.
Under our existing mill act this distinction becomes of paramount importance, for were all our streams which are capable of
floating rafts or logs, to be deemed navigable within the meaning
of the statute, it would at once place out of the protection of the
law all the mills and dams now existing on the floatable streams
in the state. The act contemplates no such destructive operation, and cannot receive such construction. The dams of both
parties are, therefore, and have been, under the general protectioD of the mill acts. The case of Bryant vs. Glidden, 39 Me.
458, is not in conflict with this view of the law, but supports it.
In all cases when the party is entitled to his damage upon complaint under the mill act, his common law remedy by an action
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is taken away: Fisk vs. Framingham M. Co., 12 Pick. 68; Baird

vs. Hunter, 12 Pick. 555; Baird vs. Wells, 22 Pick. 312.
But when an upper proprietor~has actually built or is building.
a mill on his privilege, a lower proprietor cannot, without a
right acquired by grant, prescription, or actual use, erect a new
dam or raise an old one, so as to destroy the upper mill privilege,simply under a liability to pay damages under the mill acts, as
those acts do not apply in such a case: Bigelow vs. Newell, 10
Pick. 348; Baird vs. Wells, 22 Pick. 212 ; R. S. 1840, ch.' 126,
§ 2; Do. 1857, ch. 92, § 2.
The lower proprietor cannot therefore erect or maintain his dam
in such a manner as to raise the water and obstruct the wheels of
the prior occupant above him. His appropriation to that extent,
being prior in time, necessarily prevents the proprietor below from
raising the water, without interfering with a rightful use already
made. Such appropriation of the stream, however, gives the upper
proprietor priority of right only so far as the use has been actual:
Cary vs. .Daniels, 8 Met. 466; Simpson vs. Seavry, 8 Me. 138.

The case does not show that the dam of Dwinel, as it now exists,
causes the water to flow back upon'the wheels of Veazie's Mills as
they existed at the time said dam was raised. Nor does it appear
-that the wheels of the Canal Mills, erected since that time, have
been obstructed in their operation, by means of said dam. Indeed
it may be well doubted whether the water'in the mill pond of
Dwinel or in the "basin," has been materially and permanently
raised by the new dam, for the reason that the side dam and sluice,
which have not been raised, afford space for the water to pass off
freely in that direction.
But notwithstanding this dam is thus shown' to be within the'
protection of the Mill Acts, and its owner is authorized to maintain a head of water therewith for the operation of his mills, he is
not authorized wholly or substantially to obstruct the navigation
of the stream. The river, as we have seen, though not technically
navigable, is still a floatale stream, and as such may lawfully be
used as a highway for the public upon which to float boats, rafts,
and logs. Of this right, the public cannot be deprived, nor in its
VOL. XII.-46
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use unreasonably obstructed. A dam which impedes or obstructs
the rights, of the public in floating boats or logs in a stream in
which they can be floated, must be held to be pro tanto a nuisance: Knox vs. rChaloner, 42 Me. 150.
These rights are not necessarily conflicting. On the contrary,
if exercised in a reasonable manner, are materially beneficial to
each other. While the mill proprietor may erect and maintain
his dam, he must, at the same time, keep open, for the use of the
public, a convenient and suitable passage Way, through or by his
dam. The privileges of the mill owner must be so exercised as
not to interfere with the substantial rights of the public in the
stream, as a highway, for the purpose of transporting such property as, in its natural capacity, it is capable of floating. The
use of both"parties must be a reasonable use, and the rights of
both must be exercised in a reasonable manner.
The erection and maintenance of water mills has, as we have seen,
ever been deemed matter of great public utility by the people of
this state. No other branch of industry has received more marked
encouragement from our legislature. . So, too, the rights of the public to the use of ourfloatable streams, has ever been guarded with
jealous care by our courts. They are the great highways over
which vast amounts of the property of our citizens are transported
to market, and without which much of the wealth .of the state
would be locked up in inaccessible forests. These two great interests mutually sustain each other. Without the mill, the lumber
which now floats on our streams from the distant forests would be
comparatively valueless, and without the unobstructed streams,
on which to float the product of the forest, the mill would be of
little worth. To give either interest hbsolute prerogative would
be destructive to both. Hence the rights of each must be so exercised as not unnecessarily or unreasonably to interfere with or
obstruct the rights of the other. And such is the law. The
maxim, 8ic utere tuo ut alienum non leda8, here applies with its
full force.
The evidence shows that Dwinel did provide and maintain a
convenient and suitable passage way for rafts and lumber, except
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when the pond was obstructed by edgings and other waste material
cast into the stream from the mills of Veazie, and also except at
a period of time when the side dam was out of repair.*
The effect of the breach in the dam has been the subject of investigation and adjudication in an action which has heretofore
been determined between the parties. That question isno further
important than as it may bear upon the question of review now
before the court.
It was declared by this court in the case of Dwinel vs. J7eazie,
"44 Me. 167, that the defendant had the right to use the water
above his mills to float logs to them, and also to the use of the
water to float rafts and lumber to market, and also to float away
the waste stuff from his mills, so far as such use was reasonable
and conformable to the usages and wants of the community.
This rule, it will be observed, does not afford a very distinct and
practical definition of the- rights of the parties. How far, it may
well be asked, is it reasonable to cast waste material into the
stream, which is bylaw deemed a public highway, to float whither
it may, or to sink and obstruct such way, without any direction
except mere chance? The testimony shows that the waste from
the manufacture .of lumber as now conducted has a tendency to
sink rapidly, to accumulate in masses, and obstruct the streams
into which it is cast. Do the reasonable wants of the community
require that such material should be cast at random into our
streams, to float whither the currents or the winds may direct, or
to sink, and obstruct navigation as it may?
The rights of parties are to be determined by law and not by
any local custom or usage, unless there be proof that such custom
or usage is certain, general, frequent, and so ancient as to be
generally known and acted upon, and unless it shall be adjudged
to be reasonable: Leach vs. -Perkins,17 Me. 462.
All hindrances or obstructions to navigation without direct
authority from the legislature, are public nuisances: Williams vs.
Wilcox, 8 Ad. and Ell. 314; Knox vs. Chaloner,42 Me. 150.
Any unauthorized obstruction in a highway is a public nuisance:
Lew. Cr. Law 526.
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A temporary occupation of a part of a street or highway by persons engaged in building, or in receiving or delivering goods from
stores or warehouses, or the like, is allowed from the necessity of
the case; but a systematic and continued encroachment upon the
street, though for the purpose of carrying on a lawful business, is
unjustifiable: People vs. Cunningham, 1 Denio 524.
It is a nuisance at common law to dig a ditch or make a hedge
across a highway; to erect a fence or gate across it; to deposit
lime or gravel or bricks upon it; or pile logs or lumber or stones
therein, or to extend a rope across the same: 1 Hawk. P. C. ch.
,78, sec. 48; Gregory vs. Cor., 2 Dana 417; Bush vs. Steinman,
1 Bos. and Pul. 404; Burgess vs. Gray, 1 Man., Gr. and S. 578;
Frost vs. Portland,11 Me. 271; Johnson vs. Whitefield, 18 Me.
268; French vs. Brunswick, 21 Me. 29; Stetson vs. Faxon, 19
Pick. 147.
The navigation of public rivers is governed by the same principles. The right of the citizen to use such rivers as a highway,
must everywhere within reasonable limits accommodate itself
to the same rules as in the use of public highways: Angell on
Highways, § 229; Stetson vs. Faxon, 19 Pick. 147.
All unauthorized intrusions upon public highways, for purposes
unconnected with the rights of navigation or passage, are nuisances in judgment of law: Cor. vs. Caldwell, 1 Dal.. 150.
It was held in Cor. vs. Fleming, Lew. C. L. 584, that logs
lying in the river Susquehanna, in places where the bed of the
river was covered with water at the time, and susceptible of being
used for purposes of navigation, if deposited there for mere private
convenience, and for no purpose connected with the right of navigation, constituted a nuisance in judgment of law.
Lord HALE, in his treatise De Portibus Marie, notices among
others the following nuisances that may be committed to ports;
tilting or choking up the port by sinking vessels, or throwing out
filth or trash; decays of wharves, piers,.or quays; leaving anchors
without buoys; building new weirs or enhancing qld ; the straitening of the port by building too far into the water, and the suffer.
ing a port or passage to be filled or stopped up.
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The authorities, ancient and modern, are all consistent, and
point in one direction. Highways, whether on land or water, are
designed for the accommodation of the public, for travel or transportation, and any unauthorized or unreasonable obstruction thereof
is a public nuisance in judgment of the law. They cannot be made
the receptacles of waste materials, filth or trash, nor the depositories of valuable property even, so as to obstruct their use as public highways. All such obstructions, in the eye of the law, are
deemed unreasonable.
As has already been remarked, the owner of a mill dam upon a
public stream is bound to provide a suitable, safe, and convenient
passage through or by his dam for purposes of navigation. But
such passage way or channel can only be used for purposes of
navigation. -It would be equally a violation of law to encumber
it with unauthorized obstructions, as thus to encumber the streamr
in its natural channel or course.
If, therefore, any person obstruct a stream, which .is by law a
public highway, by casting therein waste material, hlth or trash,
or by depositing .material of any description except as connected
with the reasonable use of such stream as a highway, or by direct
authority of law, he does it at his peril-it is a public" nuisance
for which he would be liable to an indictment, and to an action at
law by any individual who should be specially damaged thereby:
Angell on Watercourses, sec. 567; Cole vs. Sprowl, 35 Me. 161.
No length of time can legitimate or enable a party to prescribe for
a public nuisance: People vs. Cunninghiam, 1 Denio 524; Mills
vs. Hall, 9 Wend. 315; Cor. vs. Upton, 6 Gray 473; Brown vs.
Watson, 47 Me. 161.
It is contended that Veazie has acquired a right by prescription to a passage through the old sluice in Dwinel's main dam, for
slabs and other waste from his mills. The evidence does not sus.
tain this proposition. It does appear, that, for many years, there
was a sluice or waste way through Dwinel's dam which was used
by the owners of that dam to discharge waste and other materials
from their mill pond, and through which, at high stages of water,
slabs and waste from Veazie's Mills also passed. But there is no
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evidence tending to show that the owners or occupants of Veazie's
Mills ever claimed the right to control or use that sluice for such
purpose, or in fact ever exercised such control. But, on the contrary, the evidence does show that the occupants of those mills
have cast their slabs, edgings, and waste into the stream, to sink
or float, without direction or control on their part, and that, while
some portions thereof have undoubtedly passed over Dwinel's
main dam, or through the sluice therein, and other portions
through the board sluice and over the side dam, other portions
still have sunk in the "basin," choked up the rafting channel, and,
to some extent, obstructed the mill pond of Dwinel. The practice, however, if exercised under a claim of right, was manifestly
under the claim of a right to cast waste into the stream, there to
remain without further direction or control, and not under'a claim
to have it deposited to remain in a particular place, or to float it
through a particular channel. Such casual passage of slabs
through the sluice in Dwinel's dam would give Veazie no prescriptive right therein. As well might one who should, without authority, turn animals upon the highway to graze, claim a prescriptive
right to all the land upon which those animals might chance to
.stray. A prescriptive right can only be obtained by adverse
user, under claim of right. Nor, would the practice of casting his
waste into the stream or the channel provided for rafting boards
and running logs, it matters not how long this practice has been
continued, give a prescriptive right to continue the same if the
stream or channel was thereby obstructed: Knox vs. C-ialone.r,
42 Me. 150; Bex vs. Ward, 4 Adol. & El. 384; Gates vs. Blencoe,
2 Dana 158; Angell on W. G., 1 562.
The evidence establishes the fact that Dwinel's main dam has
been abutted upon and connected with Webster's Island, substantially as it now is, for more than half a century. Under such
circumstances a right thus to maintain it must be presumed. We
do not find any evidence tending to establish such acts of trespass
by Dwinel of the lands of Veazie situate on Webster's Island as
are described in either of his writs.
It is admitted that Gen. Veazie has not run his mills himself
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since December 1854, but that the mills since that time have been
operated by his lessees. The defendant was not- liable for the

tortious acts of his lessees unless authorized by him, anterior to
the act of April 2d, 1859, ch. 98 : Dwinet vs. Jeazie, 44 Me. 167.
The leases in the case show that they had no such authority as
would render Veazie liable for their acts prior to that time.
The foregoing opinion comes to us
through the kindness of Mr. Justice
RICE. We have read the opinion with a
good deal of interest, and although at
fikst hesitating about its publication in
our Journal, on account of its great
length, we have finally come to the conclusion, that the peculiar nature of some
of the questions discussed, and the careful and thorough manner in which they
are presented, will render it more acceptable to our readers than anything else
we could give them.
We had occasion to advert to this subject in discussing the rights of Eminent
Domain, in regard to railways, Redfield
on Railw. 168, 169 and notes. It seems
to have been long ago conceded, in this
country, that the common law rule in
regard to the navigability of freshwater
streams will not apply to the great
inland streams of this continent, some
of which are navigable for hundreds of
miles above where the tide ebbs and
flows. The question is extensively discussed in McManus vs. Carmichael, 5
Am. Law. Reg. 693, by Mr. Justice
WooDwAnD. The early cases are here
reviewed with great learning and ability,
and the rule declared that. all waters are
to be regarded as navigable above
where the tide ebbs and flows, which are
of common use to all the citizens of the
republic for purposes of navigation ; and
that navigability, in fact, is to be regarded as the decisive test, and not the
ebb and flow of the tide.
The question is discussed by Mr.

Justice MCLEAN in Bowman vs. Wathen,
2 McLean's C. C. R. 376, and the exclusive right of the riparian owner vindicated to the point of highwater mark,
and as much further toward the middle
line of the stream as may be convenient
for making erections, accessary to the
navigation, without obstructingthe same.
The question was further considered by
the same learned Judge in Works vs.
Junction Railroad, 5 McLean's . C. R.
425, and in United States vs. Railroad
Bridge Company, 6 Id. 517. The question is discussed also in Lehigh Valley
Railway vs. Trone. 28 Penna. 206; Barclay Railroad & Coal Co. v. Ingraham,
36 Id. 194 ; Flanagan v. City of Philadelphia, 42 Id. 219. In the latter case
it is held that as to navigable waters
exclusively within the limits of the state,
it is competent for the state legislature
to diminish the power of navigability
by the erection of a bridge at or below
tide-water.
The question was considerably discussed by the United States Supreme
Court in the case of State of Pennsylvania vs. Wheeling Bridge Company, 13
How. 518; s. c., 18 Id. 421.
When this case was last before the
court, it was held. that the paramount
authority of Congress, in the regulation
3f commerce, included the power to
determine what was an obstruction to
navigation. And Congress having by
legislative act legalized the defendants'
bridge, since the judgment of the court
declaring it liable to abatement as a
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ommon nuisance, obstructing the navigation of the Ohio River; but before
that judgment was carried into effect it
was considered that there was no reason
.now for carrying that judgment into
execution.
Mr. Justice NzTSON here thus lays
down the rule of law as to streams exclusively under state control: "'The
purely internal streams of a state, which
are navigable, belong to the riparian
owners to the thread of the stream,"
and they have a right to use them
"subject to the public right of navigation." They may construct wharves, or
-dams, or canaIs, for the purpose of subjecting the stream to the various uses
-to which it may be applied, subject to
this public easement. But if these structures materially interfere with the public right, the obstruction may be removed
orabated as a public nuisance." "These
jurely internal streams of a state, as to
the public right of navigation, are ex-

clusively under the control of the state
legislature." And although erections
authorized by grant from the state legislature cause "real impediment to the
navigation," they are nevertheless law
ful, and the riparian owner has no redress. This subject is somewhat considered in Morgan vs. King, 18 Barb.
277.
There can be no question, we think,
that the rule of law that the internal
rivers of a state in a section of country
where rafting and floating logs is of essential interest, are to -be regarded as
in the nature of public highways, for
that purpose open to the free use of all
who have occasion so to use them, is
founded in the soundest principle; and
that it is, in fact, nothing more than the
reasonable extension of the former rule
by which navigability has been referred
to t)1e necessities of the eircumstamces
and condition in which the people and
the eduntry are placed.
I. F. R.

Supreme Court of PennsJlvania.
TWELLS VS. THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY.
Though a railroad company may have power under special statutes to discriminate
in its rates of charge between "local" an4 other freights, yet it cannot make
any such discrimination on the groulid that certain freight is to be carried to its
final destination by another route after reaching the terminus of the company's
road.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
STRONG, J.-The substantial question in this case is, whether
the defendants may rightfully demand from the complainant higher
rates for transporting over their railroad coal oil consigned to him
UTIPhiladelphia, and received by them for carriage at Pittsburgh,
than they demand of shippers generally from the same place of
loading to the same place of delivery, merely because the com.
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plainant intends to send the oil afterwards to New York. Does
the place of final destination, if beyond the terminus of the defendants' road, justify an increase of the charge made for transporting over the road itself, freight thus destined, over the rate
established for similar freight destined for the terminus itself?
It is to be observed that the railroad of the defendants is wholly
within this state; that it does not extend beyond Philadelphia
eastward, nor westward beyond Pittsburgh. It is also to be noted
that the oil delivered to the defendants at Pittsburgh for carriage,
and upon which the charges complained of are made, is a domestic
product of the state, and as such is entitled to the spirit of the
protection (if not to its letter) extended by the commutation tonnage tax of 1861 to domestic products. If transported from
Pittsburgh to any eastern market, it must pass over the road of the
defendants. It has no other available route.
The general duty of railroad companies to make no discrimination between parties offering goods to them for transportation is
admitted, as, indeed, it must be. Different kinds of freight may
be subjected to different charges, but generally, advantages cannot
be given to one shipper, or class of shippers, greater than those
which are llowed to all others. When such companies furnish
cars and motive power, and when they become common carriers,
they are under obligation to receive all goods offered to them for
carriage, to transport them in the order of their receipt, and at
rates of compensation that are alike to all. When'the service is
the same, the compensation demanded must be the same also.
And the rule is not the less /general or imperative because there
are some seeming qualifications to it. It may be that it is competent for a railroad company to enter into special agreements
whereby advantages may be secured to individuals in the carriage
of goods upon their railway, if it is manifest that in entering into
such agreements they have only the interests of the company in
view, and when they are willing to afford the same facilities to all
others on the same terms. Thus it has been held that railway
companies may agree to carry at less than the ordinary charges,
in consideration of a guarantee of large quantities and full trainloads at regular periods, provided the real object be to obtain
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thereby a greater remunerative profit by the diminished cost of
carriage, although the effect may be to exclude from the lower
rate those persons who cannot give such a guarantee. Nicholson
vs. The Great Western Railroad Company, 94 Eng. Com. L.
Rep. 366. In re Oxlade, 1 Com. Bench N. S. 453; Ransom's
Case, 1 0. B. 437. But these qualifications of the general rule,
if they may be called qualifications, have nothing to do with the
present case. They rest upon a different principle. They are
allowable only when the exceptional regulation has reference
primarily to the interests of the company, rather than to the
advantage of a particular shipper or class of shippers, and allowable only when they relate to transportation over the company's
own railroad. In Baxendale vs. The Great Western Railway
Company, 94 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 366, Chief Justice COCKBURN
noticed this distinction as follows: "It may be convenient to
advert to a distinction not always kept sight of in argument,
between cases in which the interest of the company sought to be
promoted by the regulation or act complained of, is one with
reference to the railway itself as to which the question occurs, and
those in which the benefit sought to be obtained by the company
is one which has reference to interests distinct from the particular
railway; as where, for example, the company are proprietors
of another railway, or carry on some other business. In the
latter class of cases it appears to us clear that the company must
be taken to be, quoad the particular railway, in the position of
third parties, and that they cannot, with a view to such separate
interest, give an undue preference, or impose an unreasonable disadvantage, any more than they could do so to promote the interest
of any other party." These observations are founded in sound
reason, and they commend themselves to us as indicating a rule of
substantial justice. They fit the case now in hand, and solve it
without difficulty.
The defendants are authorized by their'charter to be common
carriers on their railroad from Pittsburgh to Philadelphia, with power
to establish, demand, and receive such rates of toll, or other compensation, for the transportation of merchandise and commodities
as to the President and Directors shall seem reasonable. It is ad-
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mitted that, in the exercise of these powers, they must treat all
customers alike. Now it is clear that if they receive coal oil at Pittsburgh, to be carried to Philadelphia, it can make no difference to
them, either in the risk or cost of transportation, whether Philadelphia is the point of ultimate destination of the oil, or' whether
the consignee intends that it shall afterwards be started anew, on
another line, and forwarded from Philadelphia to New York. The
point of final destination of the freight is a matter in which they have
no interest as carriers over their own road. If it be admitted that
they may contract to carry freight to points beyond Philadelphia or
Pittsburgh, over connecting lines, it is still true that as to all carriage beyond the termini of their own road, they stand in the position of third parties, and they can no more secure to themselves
an advantage.over other carriers on the connecting lines by discriminating in tolls on their own, than they could secure similar advantages to one shipper over another in the same way. Yet this is the
practical effect of the regulation which the defendants are seeking
to enforce against the complainant, and we cannot doubt that such
is their object in making it. They in reality say to him, " Employ
us to carry your oil, not only over our road to Philadelphia, but
thence to New. York. If you do not, we will exact from you, for
its carriage to Philadelphia, six cents per hundred pounds more than
we demand from all others who employ us to transport similar freight
only to Philadelphia. Or, if you will employ us to carry it to New
York after it shall have reached Philadelphia, we will carry it to
Philadelphia for six cents less per hundred pounds than we are
accustomed to charge others for similar transportation." No one
will maintain that they can lawfully make such a stipulation for the
benefit of a third party, e. g., one of two other carriers. They
cannot say to a shipper, at Pittsburgh, of any domestic product,
"cYou have freight destined to New York. You must send it over
our road to Philadelphia. If, when it arrives there, you will for'ward it by A to New York, we will carry it over our line at certain
rates. If you send it by any other than A our charges will be higher." This is a discrimination that cannot be allowed. Conceding
it, would put in the power of the defendants a monopoly of the
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carriage of all articles which pass over their road from either terminus to every place of final delivery. The oppressive effects of
such a rule are the same, whether its motive be to benefit third
parties, or the railroad company itself. Of transportation along
the line of their road, the defendants practically have a monopoly.
It is not consistent with the public interests, or with common right,
that they should be permitted so to use it as to secure to themselves superior and exclusive advantages on other lines of trans-.
portation beyond the ends of their road. If they contract to carry
freight to distant points in other states and countries, they should
stand on the same footing with other carriers, over other roads and
lines than their own. If they may use their exclusive powers over
their road so as to force into their own hands all external carrying
trade, and do this at the expense of a shipper or class of shippers,
it is quite possible for them to exclude one domestic product from
all foreign markets. Shippers of siLch products might be compelled
to seek a final market in Philadelphia, under penalty of such increased rates of toll beyond as to make it impossible for them .to
find any other place of sale. These consequences, more or less
aggravated, according to the will of the defendants, and according
to interests they may have distinct from those which belong to them
as owners of their road, flow naturally from permitting the destination or use to be made of freight after it has left the road, to affect
the price of carriage over it. In Bazendale vs. The Great We8tern
Railroad Company, already cited, it was held that the company
could not secure to themselves a monopoly of the delivery of goods
beyond the termination of their road by a general regulation charging a gross price for carriage on the road, including the cost
of such delivery, to all persons, whether they receive their goods
at the station or beyond. In other words, they were not allowed
to make use of their rights over their road to secure to themselves
advantages beyond it. That there are special provisions in the
English charters against granting special privileges to individuals
or classes of meh, makes no difference, for they are but declaratory of the common law. Sanford vs. The Cataivi8saRailroad Company, 12 Harris 878.
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We hold, then, that the rule of the defendants of which the complainant complains, is unreasonable, and such as they have no legal
right to enforce. The apology set up for it is not sufficient. That
the imposition of higher rates for carrying the complainant's oil
to Philadelphia, because it is afterwards to be forwarded in some
way to New York, is necessary to prevent his having an advantage
in the New York market over those who employ the defendants to
transport all the way, or over those who send oil from Pittsburgh to
New York with through bills of lading, is a matter outside of their
control. It has no proper relation to them as carriers.
An injunction will therefore be issued according to the prayer
of the bill, and an account will be decreed of the excess over the
usual or ordinary rates of freight heretofore paid by the complainant to the defendants, and the amount found by suc4 account to
have been paid in excess of the ordinary rates of charge for transportation from Pittsburgh to Philadelphia, will be decreed to be paid
to the complainant, together with interest and the costs. The
account is not to include anything more than such excessive charges
and interest..
At the same term of the court the case
of Shipper vs. The Pennsylvania Railroad Company was decided in favor
of the company by the same judge who
delivered the above opinion. The difference between the cases was simply this:
that whereas in the one case the company attempted to discriminate on the
ground of ultimate destination, in the
other they claimed precisely the same
right on the basis of origin or initial
point of transportation of freight. As
respects this particular company, therefore, the law seems to be settled that on
freight started from a point beyond the
state and coming to their road for further
transportation they may charge tolls at
higher rates than on freight, the transportation of which commences within
the state. The decision in Shipper vs.
The Pennsylvania Railroad Co. rests

upon the construction of the words
"local freight," in a statute, which,
while in terms providing a maximum
rate as the price of a release from a
state tax on tonnage, is by this construction made to justify an exception to the
general rule of equality so well stated
in the above opinion. "Local freight"
in the statute referred to, says the
learned judge, "was not simply what
was owned by citizens of Pennsylvania,
not exclusively domestic products even,
though they were doubtless largely in
the minds of the legislature, but articles
transported in the prosecution of our
own internal trade as contrasted with
those brought from abroad into the state
or carried through by a continuous transit." The case and the statute as well
as its construction being "exceptional,"
have not of themselves a very important
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may charge a less rate than the usual
one to customers who by furnishing
freight in large quantities or at stated
times, enable the company to transport
their freight at a less cost per pound
than the ordinary average cost, and in
such cases the companies do not seem to
have been held strictly to showing that
the reduction in rate corresponded exactly with the diminution in the cost of
transportation. See, besides cases cited
in the above opinion, Strick vs. The
Swansea Canal Co., Law Times Reports,
May 28, 1864, p. 460. But it is to be
observed that these decisions are made
under a statute giving a remedy for
"undue preference or prejudice," which
makes the court the arbiter between the
public and the corporation of the reasonableness or unreasonableness with
respect to the interests of the company
as carriers, of discriminations in rates
of freight. That the line has been
pretty strictly drawn, and that the company have been obliged generally to
show that the discrimination was founded
either upon an immediate benefit to them
in the reduction of average cost of transportation, or a resulting benefit by the
increase of tonnage carried, will be seen
by a reference to the cases. Among
those not cited in the opinion above are
Crouch vs. The Railway Co., 2 Car. &
Kir. 789; Parker vs. Great Western, I I
Coihmon Bench 545; Pickford vs. The
Grand Junction, 10 Mees. & Welsby
899: Baxendale vs. The Great Western
(Bristol Case) 94 E. C. L. R. 809; Piddington vs. The S. B. Railway Co., 94
E. C. L. R. 111 ; Garton vs. Railway Co.,
101 E. C. L.R., p. 112.
But in the absence of such statutory
who furnishes but one bushel, because
it may cost them much less in proportion regulations, a qualification that allows
to weight to transport the full car-load the carrying company, with a pretended
than to transport the one bushel, e. g., view to a resulting benefit to itself, to
in a car in which they have no other aid any customer in building up a busifreight to be carried. English cases are ness in the conduct of which large
sometimes cited to show that a company amounts of freight will come upon the

bearing upon the general principles of
American Railroad Law, but some expressions of the learned judge in the
introductory part of the opinion, and
particularly the limitation upon the duty
of equality of charge to persons offering
freight "in like circumstances," have
led to a somewhat closer examination
of what in the above opinion are accurately defined as the "seeming qualifications" of the general rule that "when
the service is the same, the compensation
demanded must be the same also."
C. J. L w.s, in Sanford vs. The Catswissa Railroad Co., 12 H., p. 378, after
deducing the duty of public accommodation from the grant of the power to
take private property, says: "The right
to take tolls is the compensation to be
received for the benefits conferred. If
the public are entitled to these advantages, it results fr'om the nature of
the right that the benefits should be
extended to all alike, and that no special
privileges should be granted to one man
or set of men and denied to others. The
special stipulations inserted in charters
for the purpose of securing these rights,
are placed there in abundance of caution, and affirm nothing more than the
common right to equal justice which
exists independent of such provisions."
It would seem to follow from this that
the public accommodation is paramount
to considerations of private profit to the
company, even when that profit is the
mere profit of carriage over their road,
and that they may not charge the man
who furnishes'them with a car-load of
wheat to be carried more in proportion
to weight and distance than the man
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road, by charging him less than the
ordinary rates of toll or freight, violates
the principle that "when the service is
the same, the compensation demanded
must be the same also." On the other
hand, the more plausible qualification
of a difference in rates of toll or freight
founded on the actual cost or risk to the
company of transportation, is no less
destructive of the fundamental idea that
the benefits of a railway company should
be extended to all alike. In fine, to
admit that "circumstances" may justify
discriminations or preferences, except

in so far as we may, following the English cases, somewhat" inaccurately include under that term. the kind or description of package, the time and order
of offering for transportation and such
incidents as have a direct relation to
cost, priority, or risk of carriage, is to
place it in the power of the carrying
company to discriminate in favcr of one
man or one class or set of men, a power
utterly subversive of the controlling
object and purpose of the grant by the
state to em of special privileges.
C.

United States8.District Court, Eastern District of Missouri.
Special Term, September, 1862.
UNITED STATES
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ONE HUNDRED BARRELS OF CEMENT et al.

HICKS & COCKE, CLAIMANTS.
By the Act of Congress of l3t July, 1861, and the President's Proclamation in
pursuance thereof, citizens of the rebellious states have primfi fade become, for
purposes of commerce, quasi enemies, and cannot sue in the United States
courts.
But the President having power, through the secretary of the treasury, to make
regulations permitting trade in certain cases, the granting of a license, in pursuance of this power, restores the standing of the grantee, so as to enable him
to be heard in the United States courts.
The act of foreign nations in recognising the so-called Confederate States as a
.belligerent, estops their subjects from disputing the lawfulness of captures on,
the high seas by the United States forces. But such recognition has no influence on the courts of the United States, who are guided solely by the actic a of
the political department of their own government.
Therefore, in determining the status of rebel persons and property, the courts are
guided by municipal and not by international law.
The Acts of Congress of 13th July 1861, and 20th May, 1862, are prohibitory acts,
and the forfeiture under them of goods "proceeding to" rebellious states, can
only be avoided by the production of such a license as is provided in the acts.
Therefore, a license obtained through error, or mistake, or fraud, will not prevent the forfeiture.

Libel of information for violation of the 5th Section of the
Act of Congress, approved July 13th, 1861.
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W. IW. Edwards and

. S. .Hayden, for the United States.

J. K. Knight, for claimants.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
TREAT, J. 2 -The material facts are substantially*as follows
In July last, Messrs. Hicks & Cocke, copartners in a hotel
business at Jackson, Tennessee, were residents and citizens of
that state, and 16yal to the United States.. Messrs. Harman &
Daily, of the same place, were copartners in a saloon.
Early in that month Messrs. Harman & Daily, with Mr. Cocke,
visited St. Louis, Missouri, and -purchased respectively the goods
contained in lot No. 41. Messrs. Harman & Daily bought twentyone half-barrels of whiskey, had the same packed in barrels of
salt for concealment, and caused the same to be shipped on the
steamer G. W. Graham, consigned to Messrs. Hicks & Cocke, at
Jackson. Mr. Cocke bought the other goods in said lot No. 41,
'and had the same shipped on said steamer also. Mr. Harman
applied at the custom-house, in the name of Hicks & Cocke, for
the necessary permit for all the goods, filed what purported t6 be
copies of the invoices, made the required oath, and received a
permit for Hicks &Cocke .to ship to Jackson the whole lot named,
to be delivered to them at the latter place. After said goods
were on board the steamer, they were. seized, the whiskey concealed in the salt having been detected; all of the goods were
included in the same permit, and shipped on the same steamer
for the same destination, and consigned to the same persons.
The regulations of the treasury department for such shipments
contained at that time the following provisions:"All applicants for permits to ship. and trade, shall make and
file with the officer granting the permit, an affidavit that the
values of all merchandise are correctly stated in the invoices, true
copies of which shall be annexed to the affidavit, and that 'the
packages contain nothing except as stated in the invoices; . . .
and furthermore, that the applicant is loyal to the government of
the United States, and will in all things so deport himself."
"No permits shall be granted to ship merchandise to states, or
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parts of states, heretofore declared to be in insurrection, except
for delivery to such persons residing or doing business therein, as
shall be recommended therefor by an officer of government, duly
authorized to make such recommendation."
"No permits shall be granted to ship intoxicating.drinks," &c.
The object of these conditions is obvious, viz., to prevent from
being forwarded to the insurrectionary states, any merchandise
which may be used in aid of the insurgents, or for the demoralization of the United States army there.
All commercial intercourse with Tennessee was interdicted from
the date of the President's Proclamation of August 16th, 1861,
except so far as the President had relaxed, or might relax, such
interdict with respect to any particular part of the state, or with,
respect to specified persons. The rule is similar to that recognised by publicists, as in force during foreign wars,' viz., thai
"All intercourse by a citizen of 'one nation with the adverse
belligerent, except by special license of the sovereign, is unlawful, subjecting vessel and cargo to forfeiture; and a licensed
vessel is to be treated as belonging to the country under whose'
license. she sails." Every citizen therefore who, during a war,
carries on intercourse with the enemy's country without such
special license, is. faithless to his allegiance, and subjects himself
personally to such punishiment as his sovereign may impose,'and
the property shipped, to confiscation as lawful prize: The Liverpool Packet, 1 Gallison 513; The .Emulous, I Id. 563.; The
Joseph, 8 Cranch 461; !Ie Rugen, 1 Wheat. 62; Scholefietd vs.
Aichelberger, 7 Pet. 586; The Hoop, 1 C. Robinson 196; The
Rapid, 8 Cranch 155; Wheaton on Captures, ch. 7, p. 209, 212,
219; Jecker et al. vs. Montgomery, 18 How. 110; Griswold vs
Waddington, 16 Johns. 488.
As then all commercial intercourse with Tennessee was legally
interdicted, all goods shipped to that state without a license were
forfeited to the United States. By the terms of said act, the
President was authorized to grant special.licenses for trade, under
such regulations as might be prescribed therefor by the Secretary
of the Treasury.
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The political department alone has the power to decide the
rtatas of a state, or rather of its inhabitants, as to "a condition
f hostilities" or "insurrection" against the United States govornment; and when its decision is made, the courts must apply
the rules applicable thereto. That status must remain, in a legal
sense, until the same authority decides it to be at an end. Such
N the true interpretation of the statute and proclamation: United
States vs. 129 .Packages, decided by this court at this term 2
Am. Law Reg., N. S., p. 419; 4 Cranch 241; 2 Pet. 253, 12
Wh. 19; 7 How. 1; 14 Id. 46; 3 Wh. 246, 610; 4 Id. 52, 497; 7
Id. 283.
The goods in question having been seized for "proceeding to"
an insurrectionary state, and the fact that they were so proceeding having been established, the onus is on the claimant to show
that h6 had the required license or permit. If he were before the
court, in a formal manner, prior to default taken, contesting by
claim and answer the question of forfeiture, the United States
district attorney could only by an exceptive aullegation, or by a
plea of abatement, dispute his right to be heard, or his persona
8tandi in judicio : United States vs. 422 Casks of Wine, 1 Pet.
547; 26 Admiralty Rule of Sup. Court; 45 Ad. Rule of Dist. C.;
1 Mason 368.
By consent, the default in this case was set aside, and these
claimants permitted to put in their claim and answer.
The first proposition presented to the court relates to the legal
standing of the claimant.
"An alien enemy cannot sue, nor.can he be heard as claimant.
in the courts of the belligerent captors :" 8 Cranch 226; 3 Wh.
446; 6 Rob. 24, 138, 199; 1 Dods. 244, 451; 3 Phill. §§ 461-6;
3 Rob. 143; 5 Id. 199, 218; 2 Id. 1; 8"Cranch 355, 418; Bee 74;
2 Dall. 54; 3 Id. 281; 1 C. Rob. 196; 1 Gallison 295; 18 How.
110; 16 Johns. 488.
The position of the insurrectionists towards the United States
government, at ..this time, is one of open hostility, and all the
inhabitants are quasi enemies, but -not alien enemies. Like
American citizens domiciled in England during the war of 1812,
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although they still owe paramount allegiance to the United States,
and are, therefore, neither aliens nor enemies, technically, yet
their personal property follows their domicil-mobilia sequuntmu'
per8onam-and is, when afloat on the high seas, pronounced in
law, "adherent to the enemy;" for they are under the dominion
of the insurrectionary forces, and within the territory over which
hostile sway is maintained: 14 How. 424; 8 Id. 483; 8 Cranch
258; 11 How. 47; 1 Rob. 86, 102; 2 Gall. 235, 501; 9 Cranch,
191; 4 Wh. 246, 254; 3 Pet. 99, 242; 9 How. 603; 1 Gall. 313,
295, 545; 1 Rob. 198. The Act of 1861 and the proclamation
recognise this as an organized insurrection, extending over the
states and parts of states named; and the so-called Confederate
government, at an early lay, ordered all who did not adhere
thereto, to leave those states within a prescribed period, under
the penalty of being treated as alien enemies.
The same general principles which regulate the status of persons, as to their personal property during foreign wars, were
incorporated into this Act of Congress, so far as commercial intercourse is concerned. The reasons of the rule, therefore, forbidding alien enemies to sue, are just as applicable to resident
citizens of the insurrectionary states now, as to the subjects of an
adverse belligerent during a foreign war, viz., the necessity of
stopping intercourse with the insurgents, and of preventing them
from drawing supplies from the loyal states. Two countries cannot carry on war against each other whilst the citizens of each
maintain and pursue all the conditions and relations of peace.
Two nations cannot, in other words, be at war, and their citizens
at peace. The fact of war makes all the citizens of each belligerent power, in law the enemies respectively of each other. So in
an insurrection, every loyal citizen is, in a certain sense, in a
legal condition of hostility towards every insurgent. He is bound,
when duly called upon, to aid in suppressing the insurrection;
just as, in times of peace, he must become part of the pos8e, when
summoned therefor, to assist in the arrest of an offender, and in
the dispersion of those who obstruct the officer whilst attempting
to enforce process. Indeed, every citizen not only may arrest,
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but ought to arrest, a criminal, flagrante delicto; and as an insurgent is a traitor, why is not every citizen clothed with power to
arrest him when caught in the act of treason? In every such
case, the offender, when so arrested, would be turned over to the
civil magistrate. But in belligerent operations the government,
for essential and universally recognised reasons, commissions
officers, and musters forces under their command, to conduct its
military affairs, and confines the conduct of war to them. Were
this not done, gros6 irregularities, pillage, and general lawlessness
might ensue, the policy of the .government in prosecuting the contest be defeated, and each citizen, by assuming the attributes of
sovereignty, thwart at will the great public purposes in view.
Independent of the necessities of discipline, modern warfare forbids all private and irregular warfare, which is apt to degenerate
into mere freebooting. War is the act of the state, and can be
carried on lawfully only by the state.
Whether the war, or military operations, be carried on against
a foreign nation, or revolted colony, or insurrectionary district,
the inhabitants of such nation, colony, or district, may, in a legal
point of yiew, be treated as occupyin'g similar relations of hostility, so far as commercial transactions are to be affected. Such
evidently is the scope and object of the Act of July 18th, 1861,
and such the relation in which the citizens of the insurrectionary
states'now stand towards the United States government. Their
property afloat on the high seas, or being transported by land or
water, for interdicted purposes, or unlawful commerce, is being
used in violation of a positive prohibitory statute. So, whether
viewed by the rules of public or municipal law, the same result
would follow. As citizens, however, owing allegiance to the
United States, the inhabitants of Tennessee are bound by that,
prohibitory statute. If quasi enemies, or even if treated as citizens of an adverse belligerent, they would be held to the same
rules. In accordance with these doctrines, the United States
Circuit Court for Missouri has-held that, pending the insurrection, the resident citizens of the insurrectionary states cannot
maintain suits in that court.
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But in the case now before this court, it is not necessary to
decide all incidental propositions connected with such a rule. If
the claimants, as citizens of Tennessee, have no personam standi
at this time, by force of the general rule which would treat them
as quasi enemies, are they not entitled to be heard on producing
a license to trade? During a foreign war, a sovereign may
license one of his own subjects to trade with the enemy, and such
license would exempt the latter and his licensed property from
the ordinary penalties. But if, in the course of such licensed
trade, a controversy should arise as to the right of property in a
cargo, between him and a subject of the adverse belligerent, with
whom he had negotiated the purchase thereof; and if that cargo
should be the subject of adjudication before the courts of his
sovereign, whether such an alien enemy would be permitted to
contest the matter, or be treated as capable of having a standing
in the court, by the implications resulting from the license, it is
not now necessary to discuss. The reasons of the rule, viz., that all
intercourse should cease, and that no property or proceeds thereof
should be transferred from or to the adverse belligerent country,
must, in such a case, have been 'decided by the sovereign to be
inapplicable to that particular transaction, otherwise the license
would not have been .granted. The licensed person is permitted
to trade, and as a necessary consequence to complete his sales and
purchases. No sale or purchase could be made without two parties
thereto.
Whatever might be decided in such a case, or with respect to
an alien enemy under license to trade, the proposition before this
court has distinguishing features, which it may be well to first
consider. The citizens of Tennessee are, as to their trade, quasi
enemies: 1 Gall. 295. They are not enemies in the full legal
signification of the term; for no citizen or subject is technically
an enemy. In the law of treason, a subject may be a traitor, but
never an enemy, for the moment he is pronounced an enemy, he
owes no allegiance, and cannot therefore be guilty of a breach of
a non-existent obligation. Enemy, in a legal sense, is the equivalent of the Latin word hostis, which implies that the person is a
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stranger to the country-a foreigner, an alien. Hence the rule,*
as laid down by publicists, that an alien enemy cannot sue, is so
phrased because an alien may be in a state of amity as well as of
enmity. As his persona atandi depends on his friendly or hostile
status, the term "enemy" is used in connection with the 'vord
alien, to designate that hostile status. The claimants here are not
aliens; they are not technically enemies; they are only "enemies
in a qualified sense," as Justice NELSON has correctly said. They
still owe paramount allegiance to the United States-are not
citizens of any other recognised power. They are de jure subject
to the United States laws. Those laws forbid them to carry on
commercial intercourse with the loyal states, except on the conditions named. The prohibition rests not on the law of nations,
but on a municipal statute or act of sovereignty, and the exception to the general prohibition is created by the same act. It
probably was the intent of Congress to allow such discriminations
to be made between the loyal and disloyal in the insurrectionary
states, as the exigencies of the governnent would from time to
time permit. Hence the power lodged in the President by the
terms of the proviso to the 5th section, under which the permit in
this case was obtained; .also the terms of section 8, as to remission
of forfeitures. The condition of quasi enmity, under which all
inhabitants of Tennessee were placed by the proclamation, was
subject therefore to those exceptions, as to districts and persons,
which the President might make from time to time. The temporary disqualification covering all its inhabitants, is removed as to
those who have special exemptions. granted to them, which exemptions are evidenced by licenses duly obtained. Alienage, the
President could not remove if it existed; but the legal status of
quasi enmity or hostility as to districts; or individuals thereof, he
is especially empowered to remove. Hence, the simple fact that
the claimants are citizens of Tennessee, might, in the absence of
any other fact, deprive them temporarily of the right to sue, or
appear as claimants here; but when the other fact is proved, that
they have been relieved of that temporary disability, their persona
dandi in judicio must be considered as fully restored. Such is
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the rule under this statute, and such is also the rule, as will be
shown, in analogous cases during foreign wars. But was said
license or "permit" lawfully or fraudulently procured? This
question has a double aspect. If it were not valid, then have the
claimants personw 8tandi.? Are they exempt from the general
rule of disability or disqualification? And on the other hand, if
it is fraudulent or invalid, then the goods were forfeited, wholly
irrespective of the citizenship or personal status of the claimants.
It is impossible, therefore, to decide that question without reaching a conclusion covering both points; that is, without ascertaining a fact which, if found, would be at the same time good, both
in abatement and in bar. In some stages of a case it might be
important to treat the question distinctively, in reference to one
or the other of those pleas.; but as the formal plea in abatement,
or exceptive allegation, raises the question only in an inconclusive form, it is better to consider the case upon the merits rather
than on the mere technical plea or exceptive allegation. The
regulations of the Secretary 9f the Treasury require, among other
things, that the applicants for a permit shall submit true copies
of the invoices, shall swear to their accuracy, shall take the oath
of loyalty, and, if residents of a state heretofore proclaimed in
insurrection, shall produce a recommendation from some duly
authorized officer. In order, then, to receive such a permit, an
affidavit had to be made, complying with those requirements; and
as all shipments of whiskey were forbidden, except under special
circumstances (the existence of which is not pretended in this
case), it is evident that there was no disclosure of-the real facts,indeed, that there was a false affidavit filed at the custom-house.
Harman made the application in the name of Hicks & Cocke, but
the application, affidavit, invoices, recommendation, and oath of
loyalty, are not produced in evidence here, nor is any one of those
documents shown to the court. If the permit carries with it the
usual presumption, that whatever is done by a public officer, is
presumed to have been rightly done (omnia rite ata), then is nor
that presumption repelled by the proof that twenty-one half-barrels of whiskey were included in the permit, in irect violation of
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the regulations? The whiskey was concealed in barrels of salt,
manifesting a design to defraud the government. Is it not also
to be presumed, that if the invoice had mentioned whiskey, the
officer would have done his duty by refusing a permit therefor?
The claimants must bring themselves within the exceptions-the
onus is on them-and when the permit is shown to have been, as
to part of the goods included in it, obtained through fraud and
false swearing, what credit is to be given to -thatpaper?
Without stopping here to inquire whether such a permit, based
on fraud, would be-received as good for any purpose ?-whether a
person who has to make good his claim through such a document,
will receive the aid of the court, under any circumstances, in unravelling the same, so as to separate the false from the true ?whether a false documentation is not always fatal, unless used
merely to save property from the enemy ?-or whether a person,
acting through an agent who perpetrates a fraud, is not bound by
'the acts of that agent when he avails himself of what was done?
-or, in other words, whether a principal is permitted to hold on
to all the benefits of a fraudulent act, and at the same time escape
from all the disadvantages thereof?-without going into those
general inquiries, or determining whether the fraudulent act must
not be repudiated or affirmed as a whole, it may be sufficient for
this case to -look at the testimony closely, so far as the same
touches the claimants personally and directly. There is no disput& that the permit was made by fraud and false swearing, to
cover the packages in which the whiskey was concealed. It ap
pears that Cocke, who was in St. Lbuis at the. time, did not visit
the custom-house at all. Harman acted for himself and for the
claimants. He used the names of the latter to cover the prohibited
articles, and procured a permit in their names, in which they are
licensed both as the shippers and the persons to whom, in Jackson, the goods were to be delivered. Did the claimants know of
the fraudulent use to which their names were put, and assent
thereto ? Independent of direct testimony, it would seem probable
that persons coming here under the circumstances, and knowing
the necessity of procuring a permit, and. the consequence of not
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complying with the law, would ascertain first, whether a permit
had been obtained, and secondly, whether it was correct. If
Harman had caused his own goods and those of the -claimants to
be included in one permit, then there must have been some reason
therefor. If he had not been previously empowered to use their
names, why, before affirming his act or adopting it, did they not
ascertain the truth? Their names had been used to cover a
fraud; their goods were included in the same document with contraband goods; the whole lot, honest and fraudulent, was consigned to them; they were represented as the owners of the whole,
yet they rested content therewith, without inquiry or precaution.
The regulations required an oath of loyalty from the apvlicant
himself, and a recommendation from some public officer as to his
fitness to receive the goods. By looking at the permit, they must
have seen that some one had evidently personated them, and
represented them to be the shippers of fifty-eight packages,
instead of only twenty-nine. They knew whether they had-made
the required affidavit; whether they had produced the needed
recommendation, or furnished true copies of their 'invoices, and
whether their invoices covered fifty-eight packages. If they did
not make the application in person, did they intrust Harman'with
.their papers, and- constitute him their agent for the purpose.? The'
testimony throws no -light upon the subject. Harman swears
"that neither said Hicks nor Cooke knew anything of the contraband nature of the goods shipped (the whiskey) under the same
license or permit issued to said firm of Hicks & Cocke." That is
very vague. When did they not know ?-and why did Harman
venture to make a fraudulent use of their names and papers? He
could have explained the whole transaction by his testimony, and
why did he not do so ? His silence is suggestive. He is the only
witness produced to clear up the triple fraud, and he stands
before the court confessedly guilty of fraud and false swearing in
this very transaction. True, Haskell swears that neither Hicks
nor Cocke was present at the purchase or shipment of the
whiskey, and states that Harman & Daily said to him their goods
were consigned to Hicks & Cooke to save expense. That state-
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ment was evidently false; at least to the extent of creating the
false impression that no other purpose induced that consignment.
It is obvious that the design of Harman & Daily was fraudulent,
and that their acts were equally so. As to their conduct no dispute exists. No claim is interposed for the whiskey. The simple
inquiry under this head is concerning the part which these claimants took in the transaction; whether they were cognisant thereof,
and suffered their names to be used for the contraband purpose.
"1oNsitur a socii.." Does their failure to take the proper steps
to procure for themselves the necessary permit, and their adoption
of-that obtained by Harman for them, place them in the dilemma
of either having no permit at all, or of having a fraudulent one?
either alternative being fatal to their claim: 9 Cranch 244; 3
Wh. 236; .4 Id. 84; 5 Id. 385, 127; 6 Id. 169;, 1 Wheat. on
Capt. 225; 2 Wh. 328, 371; 3 Rob. 109; 2 Id. 154, 251, 1-9; 7
Wh. 483; 1 Rob. 252; 5 Id. 277; 1 Duer on Ins. 534, 574; 2
Wildman 21 ; 2 Gall. 274 ; 1 Mason 14; 1 Gall. 401, 536, 295 ; 2
Id. 384; 3 Wh. 245; 1 Id. 417, 462; 1 Duer on Ins. 567; 1 Rob.
196, 219; 4 Id. 251; 1 Dods. 387; 3 Rob. 9; 6 Id. 127i 1 Gall.
545; 8 Cranch 451; 16 Johns. 438; 7 Pet. 586; 1 Rob. 84; 2
Brown's C. & A. Law 313, 314; 1 Kent 143.
Justice STORY held in such cases that nothing but the most
explicit proofs by the claimants could relieve the transaction of
the presumption of illegality which. arises from the fraudulent
character of the papers: The Emulous, 1 Gall. 513. Similar
views were expressed in The Rugen, 1 Wh. 62; The .Pizarro,2
Id. 241; Ihe Dos Hermanos, 2 Id. 76; The Venus, 5 Id. 127;
The London Packet, 5 Id. 132.
Indeed, that principle is a clear one in the light of sound
morals, right reason, and settled adjudications. A claimant, as
actor in a cause, appears before a court to make out his right to
restitution. When the documents on which" he relies are fraudulent, he must certainly clear himself of the taint before his claim
P~an.be established. Doubtful or unsatisfactory testimony will not
suffice. Nothing but a legal permit would entitle him to restitution. These claimants produce an illegal- and fraudulent paper,

UNITED STATES vs. 100 BARRELS OF CEMENT.

and offer an excuse, personal to themselves, for the fraudulent
character of that document, which, if legally permissible, they
must sustain by the clearest evidence. Considering the statute,
however, as the exercise of municipal or intra-territorial sovereignty, prohibiting certain commercial operations, the claimants,
no matter where residing within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States, were bound thereby, irrespective of state citizenship or residence. All citizens, loyal or disloyal, are alike subject
to the law. Hence, a decision of the question as to such citizenship
or residence, on the one hand, or as to the loyalty or disloyalty of
claimants, on the other, is not necessary in this case. The analogies
drawn from the laws of war, as laid down by publicists, may assist
in solving the constitutional questions which arise concerning the
powers of the federal government in suppressing insurrections,
and may aid also in the interpretation of the statutes passed concerning such a condition of hostilities; but the case before the
court is not one to be decided by international law, but by municipal statutes. The voyage was not between this and a foreign
country during a foreign war, does not affect any supposed neutral
right, and necessarily involves, therefore, no doctrine of international law regulating warlike operations between foreign belligerents. The questions are intra-territorial entirely, and -relate
solely to the powers and duties of the federal government, intraterritorially, under the constitution. As the power of- that
government to pass the act in question and to enforce the-same,
is conceded, or if not conceded, was satisfactorily demonstrated
and decided in this court last November, the views expressed now
might have been confined exclusively to the interpretation of the
statute itself, and the application of its provisions to the case
presented.
The position of foreign nations with respect to this insurrection,
it must be remembered, does not determine its status in American
courts. The latter follow exclusively the decision of the political
department of the United States government on that question.
Even if other nations had recognised the so-called Confederate
government as an independent power, their recognition would
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bind themselves and their subjects alone-not the United States.
Those foreign nations which have recognised a state of belligerency, and-assumed the position of neutrals, estop their subjects
from disputing the lawfulness of captures on the high seas, according to the laws of maritime warfare. The ships and cargoes of
their subjects are .to be judged accordingly. But rebel property
thue captured is amenable to municipal authority. All American
courts are bound to treat the insurrectionary states as integral
parts of the Union, and subject to its constitution and laws. In
the adjudication of all such questions arising here, the United
States statutes would furnish the rules of decision. In other
words, as to all foreign nations, the United States government is
absolutely sovereign within its own territorial limits, and over its
own subjects. Its internal constitution is a subject with which
foreign powers have no right to intermeddle. The equality and
independence of nations could not otherwise exist. However
inuch the great powers of Europe have, in times past, violated
that rule, they have so far recognised its rightfulness, as to offer,
,lways, in excuse for their violations of it some real or supposed
emergency, which they claimed worked a legitimate exception.to
its otherwise universal application-thus doing homage to the
principle even when practically assailing it.
To what extent, therefore, sovereignty is lodged in.any department of our government, is an intra-territorial question exclusively. It is not to be solved by the law of nations, but by
constitutional law. Each nation must settle for itself the policy
of its municipal code. True, in modern civilization, the so-called
public opinion of the world is not to be despised, but it is no more
the law of nations than is popular opinion at home the municipal
law. Public opinion, ever shifting, cannot be substituted by
courts for constitutions and statute books: "Misera eat aer itus.
ubijus est vagum aut incertum." The statute of July 13th, 1861,
is a prohibitory statute. As an act of prohibition, its violation is
not necessarily or generally dependent on questions of intent. As
a measure of great public policy, Congress determined that all
commercial intercourse mentioned therein, should be stopped, ex-
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cept on prescribed conditions. Mistakes, accidents, or absence
of evil intentions, form no exceptions. There must be no commercial intercourse, except on the conditions named-Ita lex scripta
est. If, however, a case arises calling for a relaxation of its rigor,
the 8th section of the act provides a mode for securing a remissiona
of the penalty: 4 Wh. 107; 7 Pet. 586; 1 Gall. 545; 8 Cranch
451; 5 Rob. 288; 4 Id. 118, 121; 2 Id. 25; 8 Id. 41; 2 Wildman
48; 1 Duer on Ins. 523, 577.
In the absence of a license, then, whatever goods, wares, or
merchandise are seized whilst "proceeding to" an interdicted
state, must be condemned. But, as in this case a license existed,
it is proper to consider more fully the rules governing such transactions.
It has been clearly settled, that a license granted to an alien
enemy removes all his disabilities; that the trade as to him becomes
lawful, and his persona standiis restored: 1 Duer on Ins. 606;
3 Taunt. 555; 13 East 332; 5 Taunt. 674; 15 East 419, 525.
As the license is an act of sovereignty, it is to be construed, as
to the grantee, 8trZctijuris. In some cases it has been treated
8tricti8simijurzi8, and in others liberally. It is apprehended, however, that the apparent contradictions and confusion referred to
in text-books, concerning the rule of construction, have no real
existence. This fundamental rule of construction is adhered to
in all the adjudicated cases, viz., that whilst private grants are to
be construed most strictly against the grantor, public grants are
interpreted most strictly against the grantee. The design or
intent of the sovereign granting the license cannot be ignored,
and the licensee must confine himself strictly within the terms of
his license. Whenever a liberal construction is given to its terms,
it is for the purpose of effecting the object for which it was
granted; of carrying out the intent of the sovereign, and not of
the grantee.
Its validity depends on the good faith with which it was procured. If terms or conditions precedent are named, they must
be complied with. Any fraudulent conduct, misrepresentation,
or suppression of material facts renders it void, ab initio: 2
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Wildman on Int. Law 250; 1 Duer 594, 602; 5 Rob. 269; 6 [d.

69; 14 East 484.
The intent of the grantor must be observed, in entire good
faith, both in the mode of procuring and of using it: 2 Wildman
245; 1 Duer 598; 4 Rob. 11, 96, 263.
Its use must be confined to the specified person, merchandise,
voyage, modes of trade, and other particulars contained in it. It
is not negotiable, and cannot be used to cover the property of
other persons than those named, or any property not named. The
licensee cannot use it to cover even the property of those for whom
he sees fit to act as agent: 2 Dods. 48; 1 Id. 508; 1 Taunt. 122;
* 16 East 3; 2 Wild. 254; 4 Rob. 263, 267.
A slight deviation as to quantity, when not attributable to
design, or involving fraud, will not be held fatal; but no deviation
as to quality of goods is permissible. Each case will be scrutinized so as to reach the bona fide8 of the transaction, and effect
.the sovereign's intent. Quantity may not always be of importance, but quality; that is, a difference in iind, or as to the contraband character of goods, may be of serious import- I Edw.
Rep. 363, 365, 371, 336, 337; 1 Dods. 241; 4 Rob. 11, 96; 5 Id.
141.
A fraudulent application always vitiates the license, and exposes to confiscation all goods embraced within it, whether innocent or contraband in quality; nor in all cases is the fraudulent
applicant the only party who suffers. A person whose goods are
included in the terms of the license, may be deprived of its protection, although he was not a party to the fraud: 1 Duer 618.
The grantee, when named, must be truly described, and the
privilege granted must be exercised by him in the character which
the license attributes to him: 14 East 484; 4 Taunt. 605; 1 Bing.

473.
If it requires the goods to belong to him, he must prove property, absolute or special, to be in him, and a consignment to him
by a general bill-of lading is not sufficient: 1 Duer 606.
Similar doctrines run through the cases in all branches of this
department of law. Thus all goods on a vessel, belonging to the
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same owfier, share the fate of the contraband portion: 3 Phill.
§ 275; 1 Duer 625; 4 Rob. 199, 260; 5 Id. 275, 325 (and cases
cited in United &ate8 vs. 129 Packages,Probasco, claimant,8upra).
By the ancient rule, a ship with contraband cargo on board was
lawful prize, but by the modern, she is not condemned therefor.
although she always suffers the loss of freight and expenses. If
her destination, however, was false, or her owner was in privity
with the contraband shipper, or was guilty of concealment, or of
misconduct, or was owner of any part of the contraband cargo, or
in any manner tainted with the contraband transaction, then his
interest in the ship is confiscable: 3 Phill. § 276; 1 Duer 625;
1 Acton 25; 1 Rob. 288, 329; 16 East 13; 3 Rob. 178, 221, 295;
2 Id. 6; 6 Id. 125; 4 Id. 68; 1 Duer 594, et 8eq.
It is thus-seen that the doctrine of licenses, as laid down by
publicists and courts, requires the licensee to act in entire good
faith; first in procuring the license, and next in the use made of
it. He is always held to the terms of the grant. If it is confined
in its privileges to a particular person, or to that person as acting
in a specified, capacity, or to particular kinds of goods, or to trade
between named ports, or to specified voyages, or routes of travel,
it cannot be used otherwise. If the modes of procuring it are
specifically defined, there must be no material deviation. therefrom. It is, in short, a special privilege granted by the sovereign,
not for the benefit of the grantee, but for the good of the state.
The sovereign, therefore, determines on what conditions the grant
is to be made, and in what manner the privilege may be used.
Every one of his subjects, and every subject of the adverse belligerent, having been placed in a condition of legal hostility by the
sovereign act of declaring war, no one can be excepted therefrom without another exercise of the same sovereign power. To
what extent and under what circumstances the rigors of war, as
to a particular person or place, may be relaxed, the sovereign
alone can determine. His decision is based on grave reasons of
state policy, connected with the objects for which the war is
waged, or with its successful prosecution. If he deems it wise, in
furtherance of the national design, to permit one of his own sub.
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jects, or even an alien enemy, to carry on a particular trade, or
prosecute a particular voyage, or hold prescribed intercourse between the adverse belligerents, he can grant the necessary license
therefor, on such conditions, and subject to such restrictions or
limitations, as he deems the public good demands. The paramount consideration in all such cases is the public good, and the
licensee must, in no respect, lose sight thereof, or fail to act in
entire good faith with respect to any of the conditions or terms
of the license granted to him.
The Act of July 18th, 1861, the supplementary Act of May
20th, 1862, and the regulations for permits, are based on similar
legal principles. All commercial intercourse with Tennessee is
prohibited, except in such cases as are licensed, and the licensees
must always confine themselves strictly to the terms of the grant,
and be in nowise guilty of thwarting the national objects for which
such grants are made. As the leading object of the government
is the suppression of the existing insurrection, and consequent
restoration of constitutional supremacy over all the insurrectionary states, its policy in the furtherance of that object, as the
competent authorities have decided, demands temporary suspension
of all commercial intercourse with the insurrectionary districts,
except under specified circumstances. What those circumstances
may justify, from time to time, is to be ascertained from the regu.
lations as made.
The application of these rules to the case under consideration
leaves no room for doubt. The claimants, in person, complied
with none of the required conditions. Harman was their agent,
or he was not. If he was their agent, by authority previously
derived from them, or by their subsequent ratification, they are
bound by his acts. The permit which he procured was obtained
by false invoices and false swearing.

He evidently was furnished

with copies of their invoices, either by themselves or by their
vendors; and from the evidence it is manifest that-the copies must
have been obtainied from them. That permit is therefore frauda
lent and void. But whether he was their agent or not, it is the
only permit under which the goods were shipped. From the evi-

